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Abstract
This article applies a psychological approach to explore and to explain the behavior of Palestinian
terrorists who blow themselves up in the light of their own words. It is shown that terrorists have no
suicidal intent; hence, their behavior is not an act of suicide. Psychological analysis point to a behavioral
reaction to stress situations that are perceived as threatening to survival, which could account for the
lethal activity of the Palestinian terrorists. These findings suggest that such terrorists could be deterred
if an appropriate alternative for their lives was available to them.
Introduction
The violent confrontations in Israel brought about by the Palestinians from 1992 to 2005 were
epitomized by "suicide bombings"—the term given to terrorists who blow themselves up along with
their intended victims . This method was also employed during the 1980s against the IDF in Lebanon, as
well as against American soldiers in the Marine Headquarters in Beirut. Of course, the outstanding
example of these terrorist attacks was the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
September 11, 2001. This method is employed today against American soldiers in Afghanistan and in
Iraq. This kind of terrorist attack primarily constitutes an operational problem for the armed forces and
the intelligence services and has also elicited academic interest. Without exception, researchers from
different schools consider that this is a case of a suicide (To name only a few: Atran, 2003. Bloom, 2005.
Kimhi & Even, 2004. Merari, 1990, 2006. Moghadam, 2003. Pape, 2003, 2005).
My point of view regarding this kind of terrorism is that of a psychologist who has dealt for many years
with the subject of suicidal behavior (Oron, 2008, 2011, 2012). Based on knowledge gathered in the field
of the psychology of suicide, this article analyzes verbal material produced by Palestinian terrorists. The
aim is to inquire, first and foremost, whether these self-exploding Palestinian terrorists are suicidal, and
in any case to pinpoint the typical circumstances in which the act is devised and carried out. The main
findings are discussed below.
The psychology of suicide
For readers who are not familiar with suicidal behavior, I will discuss in brief what it means to commit
suicide.
A straightforward and conventional meaning is when a person kills himself. Certainly, this is a necessary
factor in defining suicide but not a sufficient one, because the overt act tells us nothing about what lies
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behind it. In other words, we have to probe the person’s motivational sequence to determine whether
the ultimate act was directed at annihilating himself. Only then will we be able, for instance, to
differentiate a person who shoots himself because he intended to kill himself from another whose death
was caused by a bullet discharged while cleaning his gun.
Several features of suicide have been defined in the field of suicidal behavior, the fundamental one of
which is suicidal intent. Intent refers to the individual’s desire to die, and it is the most basic constituent
of this behavior (Leenaars et al, 1997, Maris et al, 2000, Jacobs et al, 2006).
Another facet of intention is outcome. A person who wants to commit suicide understands the lethal
outcome of his act. This kind of understanding is a vital cognitive condition that must be fulfilled, before
we can conclude that a person has put an end to his own life. However, the fact alone that a person
knows that his action, or lack of action, will lead to his death does not necessarily tell us that he
committed suicide. For example, consider the kamikaze pilots. An analysis of a sample of their farewell
letters and diaries shows that none of them expressed a desire to die or planned to fulfill a death wish
(Oron, 2006). These pilots did not volunteer to serve in the squadron in order to die but were chosen to
do so in spite of themselves. Analysis shows that they simply complied with a military command.
Furthermore, the pilots yearned to go on living, and some of them visualized unfulfilled aspirations of a
future in which they would get married and have offspring. Such pictures reflect a life image that is
absent from the future-world picture of a person who is about to commit suicide.
Suicide materializes jointly the death wish, the death intent, and the mental ability to execute it. A
suicidal act is executed by a person who is consciously motivated to abandon life and to desire his death,
and to fulfill his wish he kills himself intentionally, or acts in a premeditative fashion to indirectly achieve
his intention to carry out that wish. It is an act committed by the individual and to the individual directly
(for example, shooting oneself), or through a partial/indirect act (such as waiting on the train tracks for a
train which will cause death).
Moreover, suicides do not happen solely as the product of intolerable stressors or in a biographical
vacuum. Suicidal decisions develop over a long period of time and are never completely explained by
situational factors (Maris et al, 2000).
It is important to clarify that suicide should not be confused with voluntary death and the two different
concepts should not be used interchangeably. From a psychological point of view, it is valid to conclude
that suicide is a voluntary act, but not every act of voluntary self-killing is suicidal. True, various motives
lead to voluntary death, among them sacrifice (see section a. below), but the one that is termed
“suicide” is motivated in all situations and societies around the world by one, and only one, sequence of
behavior, namely, a craving for death (Maris et al, 2000).
Hence, in order to know what motivates terrorists to kill themselves, a psychological research, which
focuses individually on each terrorist’s psychological makeup, is needed to be able to draw the
appropriate conclusions.
Clearly one should not underestimate such an inquiry; the intention to die or to live makes all the
difference when considering psychological counter measures against self-exploding terrorists .
Do "suicide bombers" really commit suicide?
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The motive of the Palestinian terrorists who blow themselves up was examined by analyzing what was
said by ten terrorists whose assignment did not materialize, either because they were arrested before
being able to set the bomb off or did not go through with it, or because of a technical fault in the
explosion mechanism.
The analysis of their own words points to an absence of suicidal intention because their behavior lacked
the wish to die and the intention to execute this wish. Furthermore, most of these terrorists did not
volunteer to carry out a terrorist mission but were selected by the commanders of the organization to
which they belonged and complied with their commands.
Hence, the appropriate term to describe their behavior is not “suicide bombing” but a “self-exploding
attack”.
Behavioral components of self-exploding attackers
The analysis rules out suicidal intent, but rather shows a behavioral reaction to stress situations that the
terrorists perceived as threatening to their survival. The combined components of this reaction are as
follows.
a: Total Threat. Analysis of the terrorists’ statements suggests that they perceived the superior military
power of Israel as a total threat to them. What is the psychological meaning of this perception? When a
person feels that he is trapped in a situation in which he is on the verge of destruction, he must
immediately find a suitable solution to reverse this state of affairs instantly. He needs to come up with
an absolute, once-and-for-all, vital step to completely avert the impending catastrophe (Oron, 2002).
The perception of the terrorists was that the Palestinians in the difficult circumstances in which they
were at the time would be doomed without extreme combat on their part. In other words, the certain
alternative to accomplishing the death assignment would be the annihilation of Palestinian society and
with it their own annihilation. This prompted the terrorists to completely reverse the Palestinian role
from victim to pursuer of Israelis, wherever they might be. Analysis shows that the imminent religious
threat from Israel, in their opinion, was incidental to this existential threat but the combination of
military and religious threat was heightened by the leaders of the terror organizations, and found its
expression in the absolute formulations of their ideologies (Hatina, 1994). These leaders believe that the
ideologies of their organizations stem directly from the Moslem religion, Islam, along with the
imperative that all Muslims must participate in a Jihad to liberate Palestine by force. Thus, certain selfexplosive attacks might have been initiated solely as the outcome of the terrorists’ theological
perception that they, and the whole Palestinian society, were facing an imminent religious threat. For a
true believer God’s will is to foil such a threat, and it is literally unthinkable not to carry it out at all costs.
One thinker belonging to the Muslim Brothers Movement in Egypt sees contemporary Jews as the
descendants of the murderers of the Muslim prophets, and has suggested there is a murderous
potential in each of the citizens of Israel. Hence, the struggle will come to an end only with the
annihilation of the Jewish State (Mishal & Sela, 1999). In this life and death struggle, according to
Hamas, every Jew in Israel is an occupier and an invader against whom a total war for survival must be
waged in order to uproot the “Zionist cancer” (Kurz, 1993. Mishal & Sela, 1999).
Reference to cancer as a disease implies death and everyone who wants to live must eliminate it. This
constitutes a total, lethal solution to a total life threat. The use of this dehumanizing image by the
Palestinian terrorists stresses their sense of total threat and the resulting need for a totalistic program
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which provides a once-and-for-all solution. Hence it is clear why terrorist organizations have no political
solution since the very existence of Israel constitutes a total threat to every Muslim.
Note that even though terrorists were ready to sacrifice themselves, sacrifice is still not synonymous
with suicide. Sacrifice is committed by a person who has no alternative and out of a desperate attempt
to protect his own or another’s life; whereas suicide derives from the suicidal wishes to die and to end
one’s life. Furthermore, the alternative to suicide is the continuation of life; whereas a sacrifice made
when death is looming occurs in circumstances in which the alternative spells destruction in any case (at
times in objective circumstances, but at times only subjectively as in a baseless assessment of the
enemy’s intentions). In other words, the degree of sacrifice increases with the degree of the expected
loss without it, and, therefore, as long as the likelihood of loss of life is on the rise, as in war, the risk
involved in a life-saving sacrifice rises as well.
b: The Experience of Personal Threat. When the threat is coupled with a personal experience of utmost
danger, the motivation to attack increases. Analysis of the terrorists’ statements shows that a
perception of religious threat gained strength after Ariel Sharon entered the Temple Mount in
September 2000, which was interpreted as his intention to take over a holy site of Islam. However, the
bulk of the threat derives from the daily risks experienced by the terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza,
which are interpreted as an impending threat on the part of Israel. In other words, even when the
religious and national sources of hostility feed the motivation of the terrorist to attack, these sources
still must be combined with an individual experience which is interpreted by the terrorist as a threat to
himself or to his family and friends.
For instance, a terrorist who tried to detonate an explosive belt at one of the intersections in the north
of the country (that only resulted in his own injury) considered carrying out such an attack only after the
occupation of the Jenin refugee camp, his place of residence. When two others described the IDF’s entry
into the refugee camp in Jenin as what motivated them to go out on a self-explosion terror attack, they
implied that their death could take place in any case, either randomly during crossfire or as a deliberate
policy of the army to wreak its wrath on the refugee camp.
c: Semi-Military Training. The core feature of training is to obey orders. The terrorist obeys his
commanders to fulfill his duty the way he has done many times before, however risky the assignment,
and his compliance with the order to perform his last mission also derives from the semi-military
training he received.
The role of training programs is to develop skills to reduce the destructive effects of fear reaction in
combat (Holmes, 1986). Therefore, trainees are taught how to perform defined acts that will be
adaptive in the face of a specific threat. In this way, the terrorists’ minds are brimming with selfconfidence in their own strength, and as a result their anxiety subsides when they skillfully perform
these operational programs. Further, this activity distracts their attention from the threat because they
are focusing on the assignment.
The lion’s share of the terrorists who operated against Israel had already acquired military skills and
experience in the terrorist organization that sent them on their lethal missions. For example, one
terrorist was a member of the Hamas movement and took part in several terrorist attacks, including the
murder of a soldier which he admitted to when captured. His previous military training for earlier
terrorist attacks and the risk he experienced while carrying them out equipped him with both fearalleviating skills and the ability to focus on the planned sequence of operational events leading up to the
goal.
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d: Mental Defense. Even when the terrorists draw on sources of religious resentment against Israel from
their culture and share the perception of total threat reinforced by personal experience (physically as
well as religiously or by identification with a victim), they still need to undergo a process of mental
disengagement; in psychological terms—dissociation (Cameron, 1969. Hilgard, 1977. Spiegel, 1986). This
is a process of mental defense, enabling a person to ignore to some extent especially difficult aspects of
his environment and continue to function without being totally overwhelmed by anxiety. This is the case
when we see a road accident—we close our eyes or look elsewhere. Some passers-by did just this during
the collapse of the Twin Towers.
For example, consider the videos made of the “Sha’hid” (martyr) before he sets out on his last route.
The terrorist appears with a green headband inscribed with verses from the Koran, holding a gun in one
hand and the Koran in the other. His appearance is devoid of self-identity and reflects his estrangement
from his death as a personal death, because here, the person who is about to set out to perform the
terror attack is simply the representative of an ideology and not himself as an individual. The
background of the picture—the Al-Aksa mosque and the map of Palestine from the Jordan river up to
the Mediterranean—enhances the process of dissociation by a sense of symbolic immortality which
dims the fact of his demise, because of his role as a contributor to the continued existence of Palestinian
society and its religion.
Sometimes the dissociation process begins earlier, for example, when the recruited terrorists undergo
training to decrease their fear by staying in a cemetery at night. In these drills they symbolically strip
away their life and accept their lethal role as devoid of personal existence. In this way, death in the
terror attack will come to an anonymous representative of the organization. A “victory dance” over
death performed by terrorists wearing shrouds and already considered dead, adds to this process.
e: Culture and Socialization. The terrorist organizations’ refusal to accept a political solution stems from
the socio-political development of the Palestinian Arabs. At its inception is their geographical isolation
and their perception of the Zionist waves of immigration from 1904 onward as a foreign body, gradually
invading a monolithic Muslim space. In addition, contrary to religious Jews who only made pilgrimages
to the Holy Land in previous generations, the new immigrants had a clearly defined national goal.
Furthermore, the Zionist immigrants created a stir from the start because of their non-religious (virtually
atheist) way of life which was so foreign to the one that had existed for centuries, and which, according
to the local perception, threatened to undermine the foundations of social-religious existence. The
current Palestinian perception of their total annihilation by Israel has its roots in this ancient socioexistential apprehension which grew with the increase of immigration and land purchase, along with the
accompanying various armed conflicts (Porath, 1971, 1978).
Their existential anxiety did not decrease in the aftermath of the War of Independence (1948) or the SixDay War (1967), because the occupation of Arab territories fueled their perception of the Israeli wish to
spread outward in the Middle East. After the Six-Day War the Palestinian fear that the status of the
Islam in the area would be undermined augmented as a result of the occupation of Temple Mount and
the increasing influence of religious, even fundamentalist, elements in Israel (Shaby & Shaked, 1994).
Thus, prolonged objections and enmity have found their way into the ideologies of the various terrorist
organizations, along with the total military-operational actions decreed by their commanders who
believe that Israel and its army have lethal intentions against the Palestinians.
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The overall analysis of the material concerning the self-exploding terrorists shows that they are not a
monolithic group, but rather can be divided into five sub-groups. The first is made up of those who are
members of a terror organization, and the second is composed of those who have volunteered to blow
themselves up with no previous connection to some organization and did so because they were enraged
over a single incident they experienced. The motivation of the first sub-group is deeper and more laden
with the ideology of totalism than the second. The third sub-group includes terrorists who comply with
the organizations’ representatives and are intuitively chosen by the recruiters according to their
personality traits, which make them more susceptible to a type of coercive persuasion (including
children, borderline personalities, and character disorders). The fourth sub-group is composed of female
terrorists. They differ by their absence of previous membership in an organization, but their specific
characteristics requires further research. The fifth sub-group consists of men and women who changed
their minds and did not carry out the planned attack. These terrorists may shed light on the psychology
of self-exploding terrorists and on the possibilities of foiling such attacks.
Analysis indicates that members of the fifth sub-group were mainly the volunteers who were not
previously members of any terror organization (but nevertheless had to obey the orders of the
commanders of the group and to follow their instructions). Take, for example, a woman terrorist who, in
revenge for the shooting of her boy friend by the IDF, volunteered to set out with a sixteen year old boy
to carry out a terror attack in a town in the center of the country. As planned, the boy was supposed to
blow himself up in the middle of a game club, whereas she was told to wait on the street opposite for
panic-stricken people to run in her direction and blow herself up among them. The analysis of her own
description of the event shows that her ability to focus on the planned sequence of operational steps
leading up to the goal was disrupted when she looked at the passersby and suddenly saw real human
beings and not an abstract and amorphous Zionist enemy. Her animosity toward an enemy that had
been an anonymous mass gradually melted away. No less significant is the fact that she saw her terrorist
friend exploding in front of her eyes. The sight materialized the actual outcome of the sequence of
events she was about to bring on herself and also on the people around her. In addition, because she
was not a member of a terror group and had not participated in military training and fighting, her mind
was not prepared properly for the attack. The key feature, however, is that this female terrorist
perceived herself as an autonomic individual and not as an anonymous messenger of a terror
organization. Therefore, she was protected from being swept away by her hatred of Israel and the
ideology of totalism.
Concluding Remarks
This study was conducted to help grasp the motives of self-exploding terrorists, revealing aspects of the
phenomenon that have not been sufficiently studied. It also calls for the replication of the research in
Israel as well as under different unique conditions and samples around the world.
The pivotal factor that accounts for the fundamentals behind the Palestinian terrorists is the perception
of the military threat of Israel as total, and the total solution resulting from it, associated with a totalreligious perception. The analysis here shows that the religious perception is secondary to the sense of
danger deriving from the immediate military threat to physical existence, although it exacerbates it to
the extreme.
Thus, the self-exploding terrorists do not wish to die, and they act out of a perception that they have no
alternative alive. This dual finding points to the fact that presenting such a living alternative (including a
political one) could prevent them from carrying out their deeds, and emphasizes the importance of
6
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol17/iss17/1

6

Editor: Do "Suicide Bombers" Really Commit Suicide?

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
psychological research which does not rely solely on overt behavior but rather concentrates on each
individual as a case-study to determine his/her innermost motives and mode of perception. In this
connection, it is important to note that deterring an individual who wants to commit suicide is much
more complicated and frequently to no avail. In contrast, other self-killings, motivated by the desire to
live are much more disposed towards preventive measures—both the vast majority of terrorists who
use methods of killing posing low physical risk to themselves, and even those who participate in attacks
posing very high risk.
In proposing an alternative that can lead to the prevention of these deeds, it should be borne in mind
that this cluster of terrorists (and presumably the entire population of terrorists) falls into sub-groups
according to their motives, including those who abandon their mission. Applying ideas for foiling terror
attacks around the world in real life is complex, but a pre-requisite is to conduct psychological research
on those terrorists.
Footnotes
1 The author’s definition of any act of political terror is the use, or threat of use, of violence by non-state
individual actors or groups, acting in opposition to established authority in order to bring about desired
political outcomes. (The definition draws partially on Wardlaw, 1982). This activity is not considered
political-terror if it takes place as part of hostile activities between countries. The definition deliberately
avoids a moral judgment and has no negative or pejorative connotations as regards the actors, because
this would limit and even contradict the essence of any scientific research, especially involving social
Issues. Science by definition is a conceptual and technical framework for solving questions through an
understanding of the factual data. A scientific definition does not deal with good and bad. It is only
useful or not useful and these qualities are defined primarily in terms of how efficiently it can generate
predictions concerning relevant events which turn out to be verified. (The scientist’s personal stance on
social Issues is another Issue entirely).
2 From a psychological point of view, the pilots’ obedience to the command derived from socialization in
a kind of feudal social structure, and from the fact that Japan had a long standing policy of refusal to
surrender (not to be explained here). This long-range policy was behind the idea of beating the enemy at
the cost of certain death. During the war in China (1894) soldiers tied explosives to their bodies and
threw themselves on enemy positions, and in the war of Japan against Russia (1904-5) there were
soldiers who acted as “human bullets” (Sakurai, 1907/1999).
3 Several studies on the subject of terrorism base their line of research and reasoning on Durkheim’s
well known typology of suicide. However, Durkheim’s typology was sociological in nature, and he
defined his research goal as follows (Durkheim, 1897/1966, p. 151) : “We shall try to determine the
productive causes of suicide directly without concerning ourselves with the forms they can assume in
particular individuals. Disregarding the individual as such, his motives and his ideas, we shall seek
directly the states of the various social environments…in terms of which the variations of suicide occur”.
[Italics mine]. From a psychological point of view Durkheim’s typology (and his definition of suicide, p.
44) necessarily leads to an inferential fallacy because it disregards the intention of the individual’s
observed act.
4 The sample includes six men, one of whom was a fourteen year old, and four women. Three of the
men were active in the mid- 90s and the remainder took part in the 2000 Intifada. Some of the
participants were detained by the Palestinian Authority and others by Israel.
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5 The research method used was content-analysis which can be applied to written and oral material
(Krippendorff, 2004. Neuendorf, 2002). In psychology this analysis refers to the visible (conscious) as
well as to the invisible (unconscious) content (Gottschalk, 1969, 1995. Markel, 1998).
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